

CS 70 离散数学 和 概率论

DIS 1B

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Stable 匹配 Intro

Goal: 我们有 n candidates 和 n jobs; each candidate 和 job has a preference list. We want to

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pair up candidates and jobs such that there is a stable matching.

Definitions:

• Stable Matching Instance:

A set of jobs and candidates and their respective preference lists

• 匹配: Disjoint set of (c, j) pairs that are matched together

i, i

• Rogue Couple: a pair (c, j) 非 in the 匹配 that prefers each other over their current

matchings (c, j') 和 (c', j)

• Stable Matching: matching with no rogue couples

• Optimal candidate for job:

highest ranked candidate for a job in any stable matching

• Optimal job for candidate:

highest ranked job for a candidate in any stable matching

• Job optimal: All jobs get their optimal candidates; a candidate optimal 匹配 is defined

similarly

• Candidate pessimal: All candidates get their pessimal jobs (i.e. lowest ranked job 对于 each

candidate in any stable matching); a job pessimal matching is defined similarly

Propose and reject algorithm: Each day,

1. Morning: Jobs propose to the top candidate who have 非 rejected them; 笔记 that a job will

propose to the same candidate as the previous day if they were not rejected

2. Afternoon: Candidates say “maybe” to the best job offer

所以 far, keeping them in hand 或 on

a string, and say “no” to every other offer

3. Evening: Jobs cross off the candidates that have rejected them

The process halts when no rejections happen; all candidates

那么 accept their current offer. 笔记

that the 算法 only produces one stable 匹配, 所以 there can be other stable matchings 非

produced by the algorithm.

Improvement 引理: every candidate will only say maybe to better job offers as time goes on.

Similarly, every job will only propose to worse candidates as time goes on.

As a result, the propose and reject algorithm always produces a stable matching that is job optimal and candidate pessimal.

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Remember, a stable 匹配 instance is only defined as the 集合 of jobs, candidates, 和

preference lists.

It does not include the matching itself, nor any algorithm.

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1 Stable 匹配

考虑 the 集合 of jobs $J = \{1, 2, 3\}$ 和 the 集合 of candidates $C = \{A, B, C\}$ with the following

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preferences.

Jobs Candidates Candidates Jobs

1 A > B > C A 2 > 1 > 3

2 B > A > C B 1 > 3 > 2

3 A > B > C C 1 > 2 > 3

Run the traditional propose-and-reject algorithm on this example.

How many days does it take and

what is the resulting pairing? (Show your work.)

解答:

The algorithm takes 5 days to produce a 匹配. The

resulting pairing is as follows. The circles

indicate the job that a candidate picked on a given day (and rejected the rest).

$\{(A, 2), (B, 1), (C, 3)\}$.

Candidate Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5

A 1, 3 1 1, 2 2 2

B 2 2, 3 3 1, 3 1

C 3

2 Propose-and-Reject Proofs

Prove the following statements about the traditional propose-and-reject algorithm.

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(a) In any execution of the 算法, 如果 a candidate receives a proposal on day i , 那么 they receivesomeproposal every day thereafter until termination.

(b) In any execution of the 算法, 如果 a candidate receives no proposal on day i , 那么 they receive no proposal on any previous day $j, 1 \leq j < i$.

(c) In any execution of the 算法, 存在 at least one candidate who only receives a single proposal. (提示: use the parts above!)

(d) There does not exist a stable 匹配 instance 对于 n jobs and n candidates 对于 $n > 1$, such that in a stable 匹配 算法 with jobs proposing, every job ends up with its least preferred candidate.

解答:

(a) The idea is to induct on the number of days passed so far.

Base case: Candidate C receives a proposal on day i

Inductive Step: Assume C receives a proposal on day $j \geq i$ from job J.

We want to show they

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will also get a proposal on day $j+1$. 存在 two cases: C prefers J to all other offers, 或 C prefers some job J' to J. In the first case J proposes to C on day $j+1$ 和 in the second J' propose to C on day $j+1$ so C receives at least one proposal on day $j+1$.

(b) One way is to use a proof by contradiction.

Assume that a candidate receives no proposal on day i but did receive a proposal on some previous day $j, 1 \leq j < i$.

By the previous part, 因为

the candidate received a proposal on day j , they must receive at least one proposal on every day after j . But $i >$

j , so the candidate must have received a proposal on day i , contradicting our original assumption that they did not.

(c) 令's say the 算法 takes k days. This means that every candidate must have received

a proposal on day k . 然而, this also means that 存在 at least one candidate C who

does not receive a proposal on day $k - 1$ - if this were the case, the algorithm would have already terminated on day $k - 1$. So from part (b), since C did not receive a proposal on day $k - 1$, they didn't receive a proposal on any day before k . Also, we know they

got exactly one proposal on day k , since the algorithm terminated on that day. Therefore, we have

that C

receives exactly one proposal throughout the entire run of the algorithm.

(d) If such an instance existed, it would mean that at the end of the algorithm, every job would

have proposed to every candidate on its list and has been rejected $n - 1$ times. This also

means that every candidate got proposed to by every single one of the jobs, and at the very

end must have rejected $n - 1$ jobs in total (to end up with only one preferred job at the last

day). We know this is impossible though, as we learned above that at least one candidate

receives a single proposal.

Therefore, there must be at least one candidate who is not proposed to until the very last day.

3 Be a Judge

For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false and justify

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your answer with a short 2-3 line explanation:

(a) In a stable matching instance, if job J and candidate C each put each other at the top of their

respective preference lists, then J must be paired with C in every stable pairing.

(b) In a stable matching instance with at least two jobs and two candidates, if job J and candi-

date C

each put each other at the bottom of their respective preference lists, then J cannot be

paired with C in any stable pairing.

(c)

For every $n > 1$, there is a stable matching instance for n jobs and n candidates which has an

unstable pairing where every unmatched job-candidate pair is a rogue couple.

解答:

(a) 真: We give a simple proof by contradiction. Assume that J and C put each other at the

top of their respective preference lists, but J and C are not paired with each other in some

stable pairing S . Therefore, S includes the pairings (J, C') ,

(J', C) , for some job J' and candidate

C' . However, J prefers C over its partner in S , because C is at the top of J' 's preference list.

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Similarly C prefers J over her current job. Therefore (J, C) form a rogue couple in S , so S is not

stable. We have arrived at a contradiction that S exists where C and J are not paired.

Therefore if job J and candidate C put each other at the top of their respective preference

lists, then J must be paired with C in every stable pairing.
 (b) 假: The key here is to realize that this is possible if job J and candidate C are at the bottom of everybody else's preference list as well. 对于例子, a two job, two candidate instance

where the first job is best for both candidates, and the first candidate is best for both jobs has its only stable pairing 其中 the first job 和 first candidate are paired (by part (b)), 和 the second job 和 second candidate are paired. The second job 和 second candidate are each other's least preferred option.

(c) 真: The key idea to this 解答 is that we want a 集合 of preferences 对于 其中 J 和 i C like each other the least 和 make a pairing J 和 C together. In this 匹配 M each i i i unmatched couple is a rogue couple.

In particular, an instance can be constructed by forming preferences 其中 job i 's (candidate i 's) least favorite candidate is candidate i (job i) 和 an arbitrary ordering on all the others. 因此, 对于 any job i 和 candidate j , 其中 $i \neq j$, 那么 job i prefers candidate j to i (its partner in M) 和 candidate j prefers job i to j (its partner in M .) That, is every pair i and j is a rogue couple. An example for two jobs and two candidates, is the instance:

Jobs Candidates
 1 B A A 2 1
 2 A B B 1 2

The pairing $P = \{(A, 1), (B, 2)\}$ is the pairing where each pair of jobs and candidates that are not in P , $(A, 2)$ 和 $(B, 1)$, are rogue couples.

4 Stable 匹配 III

(a) True or False?

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(i) 如果 a candidate accidentally rejects a job they prefer on a 给定 day, 那么 the 算法 still always ends with a matching.

(ii)

The Propose-和-Reject Algorithm never produces a candidate-optimal matching.

(iii)

If the same job is last on the preference list of every candidate, the job must end up with its least preferred candidate.

(b) As you've seen from lecture, the jobs-proposing Propose-和-Reject 算法 produces an employer-optimal stable 匹配. 令's see 如果 the candidate have any way of improving their standing. 假设 exactly one of the candidates has the power to arbitrarily reject one proposal, regardless of 其中 job they have on their string (如果 any). Construct an 例子 that illustrates the following:

for any $n \geq 2$, there exists a stable matching instance for which

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using this power help every candidate, 即 every candidate gets a better job than they would have gotten under the jobs-proposing Propose-和-Reject Algorithm.

解答:

(a) (i) 假, consider the case:

Jobs Candidates

1 A B A 1 2

2 B A B 2 1

Using SMA, the 匹配 will be: (A, 1), (B, 2). 如果 candidate A rejects job 1 despite having no other jobs on their string, job 1 will propose to candidate B 和 also get rejected. This leaves both candidate A 和 job 1 partnerless. In this case, the accidental rejection prevents a matching from being produced at all.

(ii) 假. 假设 that all jobs have a different first choice. Also supposed that the job proposing is each candidate's first choice. In this case, the 算法 would end after the first day with both jobs 和 candidates ending with their top pick. In this case, the result is candidate-optimal.

(iii)

假, consider the following case where jobs are numbers and candidates are letters:

Jobs Candidates

1 A B A 2 1

2 B A B 2 1

Job 1 is last on every candidate's list, 然而, $\{(A, 1), (B, 2)\}$ is a stable pairing 其中 job 1 got its top choice candidate.

(b) 不失一般性, 假设 that candidate 1 is the candidate with this special power.

Now, assume the preference lists are ordered as follows:

Job Preferences Candidate Preferences

1 $1 > 2 > \dots > n$ $1 > n$ 1 $n > n$ $1 > \dots > 2 > 1$

2 $2 > 3 > \dots > n$ $1 > n > 1$ 2 $1 > n > n$ $1 > \dots > 2$

3 $3 > 4 > \dots > n > 1 > 2$ 3 $2 > 1 > n > n$ $1 > \dots > 3$

\dots

$n > 1 > 2 > \dots > n$ 1 $n > n$ 1 $n > 2 > \dots > 1 > n$

If the Propose-和-Reject Algorithm was run with these preference lists, then each candidate would be stuck with their least-preferred job. 然而, 令's say candidate 1 rejects job 1

on the first day, 即使 they have nobody on their string. 那么, job 1 will be forced to

propose to its second option, candidate 2, 和 they will accept because the job is their first

choice. Now, job 2 has no partner 和 will propose to candidate 3, who will accept, leaving

job 3 without a partner. This process continues 直到 job n proposes to candidate 1. One

rejection has led all candidates to get their best choice instead of their worst choice!